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Abstract
Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (GSOEP), it is shown that
income comparison with persons who are better off has a clear impact on the job satis-
faction of West German full-time employees. Two contrary effects can be identiﬁed. On
the one hand, there is an aversion to disadvantageous regional income inequality, while
on the other hand, individuals prefer inequality within their occupational group. The two
effects are interpreted as envy and an information (or “tunnel”) effect, respectively. The
analysis of income comparison with persons who are worse off suggests a prestige effect.
However, downward comparison is of minor importance for job satisfaction.
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1 Introduction
Astandard assumptionoftheneoclassicalframework isthatutilityis derivedfrom income
by using it as a means of consumption of goods. However, income not only provides
direct utilityfromconsumptionbutmayalsohaveanindirect impactonindividualwelfare
because relative position in the income distribution constitutes a person’s social status.
Veblen (1994) supposed a close relationship of consumption and the social status. In
his “Theory of the Leisure Class”, consumption is both a source of direct utility and an
expression of striving for social status. By conspicuous consumption, an individual sig-
nals possession of certain socio-economic characteristics that cannot be directly observed
by other people. The demonstration of such characteristics promotes other people’s good
opinion of the agent, which in turn increases his/her welfare.
Since the seminal study of Easterlin (1974) the inﬂuence of relative income on sub-
jective well-being is on the agenda for empirical research. Building on the idea that an in-
dividual’swelfare function of income is equivalent to a (perceived) distribution of income
(an idea that includes social comparison because any income level is evaluated by its rank
in the distribution of income), van de Stadt et al. (1985) ﬁnd empirical evidence for the
hypothesis that utility is relative. Clark and Oswald (1996) choose a different approach.
Utilizingthejobsatisfactionquestionin theBritishHouseholdPanel Survey(BHPS), they
show that comparison income (which is deﬁned as the predicted income from an earnings
regression) has a negative impact on job satisfaction. Senik (2005) provides an overview
of empirical studies that investigate the relationship between the distribution of income
and well-being. Further examples are Luttmer (2005) who scrutinizes the impact of local
earnings on well-being—his ﬁndings indicate a substantial, negative effect of the income
of persons living in the environs on well-being—and D’Ambrosio and Frick (2004) who
demonstrate a direct linkage between the concepts of relative deprivation and subjective
well-being.
Naturally, these ﬁndings raise the question why relative income matters at all. An an-
swer has to consider the process of social comparison. Festinger (1954) in his “Theory of
Social Comparison Processes” formulates the hypothesis that “people evaluate their opin-
ions and abilities by comparison respectively with the opinions and abilities of others”2. Well-Being and Social Comparison 3
(p. 118).1 In addition, Singer (1966) points out that the process of social comparison pro-
vides individuals with information about themselves, which is the basis for self-esteem:
“When a person asks ‘How much X do I have?’ he is also asking ‘What sort of person am
I for possessing that much X?’ ” (p. 105). Consequently, social comparison is constitutive
for social status and, with it, for self-approval.
This paper adopts the idea that humans derive well-being from their social status. It
concentratesonthesocialstatusobtainedfromlaborincome. Anattemptismadetomodel
and to estimate empirically the impact of social comparison on individual welfare. The
empirical analysis focuses primarily on two questions. The ﬁrst questionis whether social
comparison has a direction, i.e., is social comparison directed upward or downward? The
second question concerns what preferences individuals have for income inequality. Such
preferences can be derived from the (positive or negative) welfare effects that result from
social status.
The paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2 some theoretical considerations are
madeabouthowtheprocessofsocialcomparisoncan beimplementedinautilityfunction.
The speciﬁcation of the econometric model and a short description of the data can be
foundin Section 3. Theestimationresults are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Well-Being and Social Comparison
Assuming that, apart from consumption, social status mediated by relative income posi-
tion yields utility, the utility function of an individual i can be written as
Ui =U(V(yi,Fi),S(yi,yj)) (1)
where Ui denotes the well-being or utility level of a person i. Utility is, on the one hand,
a functionV of own income yi and leisure Fi. The value of the functionV(yi,Fi) gives in-
formation about how the income is used in welfare-relevant consumption and how much
satisfaction is derived from leisure (¶U/¶V > 0). It is assumed that both a rise in income
1 Differences in income can be regarded as a difference in ability because (labor) income is a monetary
equivalent of an individual’s productive ability.2. Well-Being and Social Comparison 4
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and additional leisure increases utility (¶V/¶yi > 0 and ¶V/¶Fi > 0). On the other hand,
welfare results from the function S(yi,yj), which captures the impact of social compar-
ison. The variable that is relevant for comparison is income. The value of S(yi,yj) is a
measure of the contentment derived from social status. Following Dakin and Arrowood
(1981), this component is denoted self-value.
The function S captures two effects of social comparison on well-being. Firstly, from
the process of social comparison people get information about whether they are esteemed
by the members of the reference group. Secondly, the relative income position in the ref-
erence group is also an important yardstick of self-approval. The distribution of income
represents an Archimedean point that forms the basis of a judgment of one’s own success
or failure. Figure 1 illustrates the constitutive importance of the process of social com-
parison for well-being. Therefore, an investigation of well-being that results from relative
income position has to concentrate on social comparison.
How can the mechanism of self-value be described in more detail? It is assumed that
income is a suitable indicator for the social status and that the self-value results from a
comparison of income. Thus, the self-value can be generally understood as a function of
the difference in income, i.e., S = f(yi −yj). Similar approaches that operate by calcu-
lating the difference in certain variables have been used to analyze the impact of social
comparison, for example, by Dakin and Arrowood (1981), Loewenstein et al. (1989) and
Fehr and Schmidt (1999). In order to distinguish between comparisons with people who
are poorer and those who are richer, the income of all n persons in the reference group is
sorted so that yP
1 < ... < yP
i−1 < yi < yR
i+1 < ... < yR
n. All incomes that are smaller (larger)2. Well-Being and Social Comparison 5
than that of comparing person i are assigned to individuals of a lower (higher) social sta-
tus. In consequence, two comparison groups exist within the reference group: the richer
and poorer reference individuals. In addition, it is assumed that a person compares him
or herself with all persons in each reference group. Thus, the function S can be written as
S =
a
n−1
n
å
j=i+1
(yR
j −yi)+
b
n−1
i−1
å
j=1
(yi−yP
j) (2)
where n > 2. The ﬁrst sum on the right hand side of equation 2 measures the disadvan-
tageous inequality that results from the comparison with richer individuals . It can be
interpreted as an indicator of the relative deprivation of individual i (cf. Runciman 1966;
Yitzhaki 1979). The second sum represents the comparison with the poorer ones, i.e., the
advantageous inequality. It is the counterpart of the relative deprivation and can, there-
fore, be denoted as relative satisfaction. Additionally, the aggregate differences in income
are normalized by dividing by the number of persons in the reference group (minus one
for the comparing person), which yields the average difference in income. Including the
parameters a and b, the upward and the downward comparison can enter the self-value
with a different weight. For example, from |a| ≫ |b| it follows that comparison with
richer people has a stronger impact on the self-value than comparison with poorer ones.
The speciﬁcation of self-value is similar to the way Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model
the social comparison. The authors formulate a theoretical approach in which they as-
sume, however, inequality aversion. In particular, they exclude the existence of individ-
uals who want to be better off than others. And/or they consider those people at least
as irrelevant for their analysis. In contrast, this study imposes no a priori restrictions on
the parameters a and b. It pursues, rather, the investigation of preferences concerning
inequality as revealed in ﬁeldwork. Thus, the following interpretations of the parameters
are possible:
Information effect a > 0: Considering the richer reference individuals, the self-value
riseswith theaveragedifference inincome. Thisimpliesapreference fordisadvantageous
income inequality. In this case, inequality increases well-being because the individual
interprets it as a signal for a future improvementof his own relativeposition in the income2. Well-Being and Social Comparison 6
distribution. Hirschman and Rothschild(1973)denotethisphenomenonas atunnel effect,
which is an analogy from trafﬁc. In a trafﬁc jam on a road with two lanes, the vehicles
that begin to move in one lane give a signal to those in the stationary cars in the other
lane. The drivers of the stationary cars anticipate the dissolution of the trafﬁc jam and an
imminent resumption of their travel.
In the context of an investigation of the welfare effects of social comparison, the
analogy can be made precise as follows. Apart from present income, welfare depends
on the expected growth of income in the future. However, individuals have only a little
informationconcerning their future income. In order to improvetheir informational basis,
they try to predict their ﬁnancial future on the basis of the present situation of people in
comparable circumstances. If a favorable development in the ﬁnancial situation of other
persons is perceived and this development is attributed to the economic environment,
then they may expect to beneﬁt from this development in the future. The expectation of
ﬁnancial progress may, as a result, induce a positive welfare effect.
Hirschmanand Rothschild(1973)deducea Pareto improvementfrom thetunnel effect
because “everybody feels better off, both those who have become richer and those who
have not” (p. 548). Admittedly, the authors mention the problem that the social climbers
cannot realize their hope for a welfare improvement, because a substantial obstacle ex-
ists in the lack of acceptance by older elites who would discriminate against the nouveau
riche.2 However, they disregard a problem included in the model: self-deception. The
tunnel effect can lead to a lower welfare level in the long run when the individual man-
ages to improve his/her relative income, i.e., when the average difference in income with
respect to richer individuals is reduced. This is a consequence of the fact that an increase
in income is associated with the abandonment of hope for such an improvement. If the
lossof hopeisnot compensated by a utilitygain from material consumptionoran increase
in prestige, it can lead to a (net) welfare loss even when social mobility is granted, i.e.,
when the social climbers are accepted by the old elites.
2 Beyond that, Hirschman and Rothschild (1973) discuss a further problem. The social climbers could
have an inequality aversion and could be discontented with their own social advancement because other
people remain in an inferior income position. However, the speciﬁcation of self-value as social compar-
ison in equation 2 permits us to ignore this effect here because the comparison with poorer individuals
is modeled on the basis of the parameter b.2. Well-Being and Social Comparison 7
Envy a < 0: Well-being decreases with an increase in the average disadvantageous in-
equality. A person prefers a distribution of income in which he or she is not ﬁnancially
worse off compared to other people. Such a preference might be closely associated with
the suspicion that there is probably something unfair going on, e.g., individuals have the
opinion that their performance or productivity is not inferior to that of wealthier people
and that, therefore, the monetary evaluation of the market is inappropriate.
Prestige b > 0: The larger the average difference in income with respect to poorer ref-
erence individuals is, the higher the contentment with one’s own achievement. This posi-
tive welfare effect can be interpreted as a prestige effect. In this case, a person perceives
the approval of other persons for his or her own performance, which leads to a higher
self-value. Beyond that, higher prestige is often accompanied with an (at least informal)
expansion of the sphere of inﬂuence that extends the actual scope of action.
Regret b < 0: The larger the average difference in income with respect to the poorer
reference persons is, the smaller the own welfare from the self-value is. The reason for
the welfare loss, which enlarges with an increase in own income, can result, on the one
hand, from the fact that one does not experience approval for one’s performance from
the poorer members of the reference group. On the other hand, the welfare loss can
also be a consequence of one’s disapproval for the poorer persons’ performance. Such a
feelingofdisapprovalstemsfromaconcretedisadvantageforthepersonwhoisevaluating
him/herself. To illustrate this issue, suppose a situation in which co-operation exits in
the reference group, for example, concerning the supply and ﬁnancing of a public good.
Individuals are assumed to be identical with respect to their productive ability. However,
there are persons who do not make use of their full productive ability and are, hence,
poorer. In other words, the less productivemembers of the reference group are considered
free-riders because their insufﬁcient performance may result in larger contributions from
those who fully exploit their productive abilities. The richer persons’ feeling of a lower
self-value may result from the fact that they experience a higher ﬁnancial burden and
regard themselves as the losers in the co-operative relationship.3. Econometric Model and Data 8
While the two categories envy and regret are closely associated with an aversion to in-
equality (that can equivalently be interpreted as risk aversion), the prestige and informa-
tion effects imply a preference for inequality. A social and economic policy that makes
use of incentives based on income inequality (e.g., when lowering welfare beneﬁts and
reducing taxation of labor income) will be appropriate for increasing the social welfare if
the preferences concerning income distribution can be characterized by the prestige and
information effects. If, in contrast, envy and regret determine the individuals’ self-value,
the same policy will lead to a reduction in well-being (at least concerning self-value). No
general preference for and/or aversion to inequality follows from the preference combi-
nations prestige/envy and regret/information effect. Table 1 gives an overview.
Table 1
Preferences for inequality deduced from the self-value
information effect a > 0 envy a < 0
prestige
b > 0
general preference for inequality preference for advantageous inequality,
aversion to disadvantageous inequality
regret
b < 0
preference for disadvantageous inequality,
aversion to advantageous inequality
general aversion to inequality, or risk
aversion
3 Econometric Model and Data
The process of social comparison of people in the labor market is the main topic of the
empirical analysis. One can assume that (gross) labor income is a meaningful indicator
of social status because workers who sell their labor to ﬁrms are to a certain extent in a
competitive situation. Thus, it seems plausible to suppose that income is relevant to the
process of social comparison.
First of all, the empirical evaluation of the welfare effects of social comparison re-
quires a speciﬁcation of the utility function. The self-value S was introduced and dis-
cussed above, so that an econometric model can be written as follows.
SWBi = b0+b1
1
n−1
n
å
j=i+1
(yR
j −yi)+b2
1
n−1
i−1
å
j=1
(yi−yP
j)+b3lnyi+b4lnHi+x′
iβ+hi
(3)3. Econometric Model and Data 9
The material satisfaction of needs is modeled as logarithm of income, lnyi. Logarithmic
working time, lnH, is substituted for leisure in the utility function. In addition, utility
depends on individual and institutional characteristics x. The parameters of interest are
denoted b. In particular, b1 and b2 are empirical values for the parameters a and b of
self-value. h is an error term. SWB represents subjective well-being.
The German Socio-Economic Panel Study (GSOEP) provides the data required. The
GSOEP is a representative longitudinal study of private households in the Federal Re-
public of Germany that was started in 1984. The same persons are surveyed annually (cf.
Haisken-DeNew and Frick 2005). This paper makes useof ten waves from 1995 to 2004.3
The employees’ utility is approximated by their job satisfaction, which is captured by
the following survey question:
“How satisﬁed are you with your job?” (Infratest Sozialforschung 2004)
Job satisfaction is assessed on a scale from 0 (totally unhappy) to 10 (totally happy).
Among economists, subjective well-being is a widely accepted approximation for util-
ity. Therefore, Frey and Stutzer (2002) discuss the integration of happiness research into
economic analysis and Blanchﬂower and Oswald (2004) make a direct connection be-
tween a person’s utility and self-reported well-being by introducing a reported well-being
function.
The sample consists of dependent employees who are in full-time employment and
work for at least 35 hours per week. The sample is restricted to people who live in West
Germany since, even 16 years after reuniﬁcation, the perception of and the preferences
concerning economic inequality may still be fundamentally different in East and West
Germany. For the same reason, foreigners are excluded. An overview of descriptive
statistics is in the appendix A.
3 The data used in this paper was extracted from the SOEP Database provided by the DIW Berlin
(http://www.diw.de/soep) using the Add-On package SOEP Menu v2.0 (Jul 2005) for Stata(R). SOEP
Menu was written by Dr. John P. Haisken-DeNew (john@soepmenu.de). The following authors sup-
plied SOEP Menu Plugins used to ensure longitudinal consistency, John P. Haisken-DeNew - h2817x
p2266x p2278x p2282x p2291x p2294x p2297x p3468x p3469x p3471x p488x p527x p81x, Markus
Hahn and John P. Haisken-DeNew (GENERATED) - p2267x. The SOEP Menu generated DO ﬁle to
retrieve the SOEP data used here and any SOEP Menu Plugins are available upon request. Any data or
computationalerrors in this paper are my own. Haisken-DeNew (2005)describes SOEP Menu in detail.3. Econometric Model and Data 10
The deﬁnition of the reference group is of central importance. For this purpose, the
people with whom an individual compares him/herself have to be identiﬁed. Two kinds of
reference groups are distinguished. Firstly, the geographical region is used as a classiﬁer.4
In this case, the reference group consists of all employees who livein a geographical area,
i.e., a district. This deﬁnition is based on the consideration that the people have a rela-
tivelysoundknowledgeofthesocio-economicsituationofthosewithwhomtheycompare
themselves. For example, they can observe the reference individuals’socio-economic life
circumstances quite easily. Since social comparison is carried out between different occu-
pational groups, income of perhaps very different occupations may be compared. Thus,
the attitudes that come to light in such a comparison are of a rather general nature and
might provide a picture of a global preference to income inequality.
Table 2 gives some descriptive statistics for the sample. For the entire period, 326
regional reference groups were generated based on geographical districts. On the aver-
age, 29.4 individuals are included in these regional entities per year. Not every reference
group is available in every year. The average difference in (gross) labor income is 602
euro (in constant 2001 prices). Income inequality is calculated on the basis of a gen-
eralized entropy measure, the mean logarithmic deviation I(0), for the entire period (cf.
Shorrocks 1984). This measure can be decomposed with respect to the reference groups
and inequality can be calculated within and between the reference groups. The ﬁgures
show that 92% of the inequality can be attributed to the inequality within the reference
groups. Only a relatively small portion of 8% arises between the regions.
The second reference group is deﬁned according to the occupation of the employees.
Here, income inequality must be interpreted in a slightly different way because prefer-
ences regarding inequality capture the welfare effect of a variation in wages within an oc-
cupational group. The occupational groups are classiﬁed on the basis of the International
Standard Classiﬁcation of Occupations (ISCO-88) (cf. Elias 1997). 268 occupational ref-
erence groups are generated, which include 50.6 individuals per year on the average. The
average difference in income is 553 euro, which is clearly smaller than in the case of the
regional reference groups. The inequality measure I(0) indicates that 71% of the total in-3. Econometric Model and Data 11
Table 2
Reference groups and income inequality
reference groups
region occupation
number of groups 326 268
average group size 29.4 50.6
minimum group size 2 2
maximum group size 176 192
average difference in income (in euro) 602 553
I(0) 0.134 0.134
I(0) Within 0.123 0.095
I(0) Between 0.011 0.039
Note: Inequality measure I(0) is calculated for the sample used in table 4.
Source: GSOEP 1995 to 2004.
equality is due to inequality within the occupational groups, while the inequality between
the occupational groups is 29% of the total inequality.
The estimation of the parameters in equation 3 depends substantially on the speci-
ﬁcation of the error term h. In this context, it has to be considered that the data have
a hierarchical structure. On the one hand, several longitudinal observations are nested
within individuals and, on the other hand, individuals are nested in regional or occupa-
tional reference groups. For example, employees who live in the same district are equally
affected by inﬂuences that are not controlled in the model—for example, the regional la-
bor market situation and the future economic prospects in the region. If the unobserved
heterogeneity in the levels of the individuals or the reference groups is relevant and not
controlled for, the parameter estimates will be inefﬁcient or even biased. To account for
thedependencies on both levels,theerror is speciﬁed as (vgl. Baltagi et al. 2001;Skrondal
and Rabe-Hasketh 2004)
hi = µk+nki+ekit . (4)
4 The regional information is at a higher level of data security than the standard scientiﬁc use ﬁle of the
GSOEP. Therefore, this part of the research was carried out at the DIW Berlin.3. Econometric Model and Data 12
µk and nki denote the reference group-speciﬁc and individual-speciﬁc effects, respec-
tively.5 Both are assumed to be time-invariant. ekit is the idiosyncratic error. It is further
assumed that
µk ∼ N(0,s2
µ), nki ∼ N(0,s2
n), and ekit ∼ N(0,s2
e). (5)
The resulting multi-levelmodel was estimated using the command xtmixed implemented
in the software package Stata. In addition, all model speciﬁcations were estimated with-
out controlling for the inﬂuence of the reference group (i.e., without µk). Based on a
likelihood ratio test the hypothesis was tested whether s2
µ = 0. This could be rejected
only for the regional reference group. As a result, all remaining models were estimated
without the parameter µk and are, therefore, identical to usual random effects models.
Apart from modeling the unobserved heterogeneity as a random intercept, a ﬁxed ef-
fects model is an alternative. The ﬁxed effects approach provides a consistent estimator
when the unobserved heterogeneity is correlated with the explanatory variables. How-
ever, Mundlak (1978) points out that the decision is not whether the individual effect is
stochastic or ﬁxed but rather whether the inferences are for the population or the sam-
ple. The true but unknown effect of the exogenous variables, i.e., the coefﬁcient vector b
that is constant for all individuals, should not depend on the method of estimation. Both
procedures will yield the same results if the model speciﬁcation is correct. Differing coef-
ﬁcients are caused by an incorrect model speciﬁcation. Thus, the question is not whether
the estimation procedure is correct but rather whether the model speciﬁcation is appro-
priate. Therefore, ﬁxed effects estimators are presented and discussed for the model in
table 4.
5 This speciﬁcation has a certain shortcoming as it assumes that a lower-level cluster is nested only in
one higher-level cluster. In particular, an individual can only belong to one reference group. The
speciﬁcation and estimation of a more complex multiple-membershipmodel is on the agenda for future
study.4. Estimation Results 13
4 Estimation Results
A yardstick for the results of the models that include the process of social comparison
is provided by estimating equation 3 without the social comparison, i.e., without the pa-
rameters b1 and b2 (cf. table 3). In this estimation, results from other investigations are
conﬁrmed (cf. Clark 1996; Clark et al. 1996). The signs of the coefﬁcients of the variables
age and age squared indicate a U-shaped relationship between job satisfaction and age.
The inﬂuence of logarithmic labor income is, as expected, highly signiﬁcant and positive.
From a theoretical point of view, a decrease in satisfaction is expected when work-
ing hours increase. This hypothesis is conﬁrmed very clearly. It is noticeable that the
absolute value of the estimator for the coefﬁcient of the working hours is larger than
that for income. Since both variables are logarithmic, the quotient of the coefﬁcients
can be interpreted as an elasticity. On the basis of the coefﬁcients estimated, the elas-
ticity is ¶lny/¶lnH = 0.308/0.206 = 1.5. As a consequence, an individual requires a
super-proportional growth in wages when working hours increase so that his/her welfare
remains constant.
Apart from further control variables, as for example, education, family status, health
status etc., a variable that measures the number of years since the ﬁrst interview in the
GSOEP is included. The variable controls for panel and/or learning effects of persons
who have been participating for a longer period in the study. Such effects may affect the
data concerning the subjective well-being (cf. Ehrhardt et al. 2000). Thus, Landua (1993)
pointsto thefact thatthere isa declineinthevalues forsatisfactionthat resultssolelyfrom
the repeated interviews. The quality of the data improves, however, after participation in
several interview waves. As expected, the results point to a highly signiﬁcant, negative
impact of the number of years since the ﬁrst interview on job satisfaction.
A dummy variable captures the effect of face-to-face interviews, i.e., whether the
interview was carried out by an interviewer or whether the questionnaire was ﬁlled out
by the respondent alone. The estimator indicates a positive impact when an interviewer
was present. An explanation for this ﬁnding is that the respondents adopt an attitude of
reserve and do not admit their discontentmentin the presence of the interviewer. Possibly,
the respondents are afraid that the interviewer may not comprehend their discontentment.4. Estimation Results 14
In the following, the impact of the process of social comparison on job satisfaction
operating through the mechanism of self-value is discussed. First, the analysis focuses
on the regional reference groups. In a second step, income inequality in the occupational
reference groups is considered in more detail. In addition, a model that investigates social
comparison in both kinds of reference groups simultaneously is presented at the end of
the section.
For the regional reference groups, the estimator of the coefﬁcient b1, which captures
the welfare effect of the disadvantageous inequality, is highly signiﬁcant and negative(cf.
columns 2 and 3 in table 3). This means that the larger the average difference between
one’s own income and the income of richer people is, the lower one’s job satisfaction
is. Apparently, the individuals have feelings of envy towards richer people living in the
same district. The comparison with poorer people is captured by the estimator for b2. A
positive welfare effect is indicated. The larger the average difference in income regarding
the poorer reference people is, the higher job satisfaction is. This effect can be interpreted
as a welfare gain that results from an increase in prestige.
Figure 2
Relativeimpactofincome resulting from thematerial satisfactionofneeds and social
comparison on job satisfaction
¶SWBi/¶yi : 100%
material satisfaction 29.9% social comparison 70.1%
envy 45.8% prestige 24.3%
Note: Calculations on the basis of the estimation results for the regional reference group in table 3 for the
median position.
From the analysis it follows that an increase in own income generates additional job
satisfaction from both the loosening of the budget constraint (i.e., material satisfaction)
and social comparisons (i.e., more prestige and less envy). In order to get an idea of
the relative size of these effects, the additional welfare from a marginal increase in labor
income is calculated for a representative individual that takes the median position in the4. Estimation Results 15
reference group. From this follows that the number of people with a higher income is
equal to the number of people with a lower income. On this assumption, the number
of people in the reference group is n = 2i−1 and there are n−i−1 persons who are
wealthier and just as many who are poorer. The marginal utility of an increase in income
is
¶SWBi
¶yi
=
i−n
n−1
b1+
i−1
n−1
b2+b3
1
yi
=
1
2
(b2−b1)+b3
1
yi
. (6)
The welfare effects of an increase in income can be decomposed according to equation 6
into three components whose relative weights can be evaluated. The calculation assumes
that the median position has a (gross) labor income of 2000 euro. Firstly, the increase in
welfare due to the loosening of the budget constraint (i.e., due to the additional material
satisfaction) is 30% of the total effect.6 Secondly, the increase in income reduces the
feelings of envy towards the richer people in the reference group. The decrease in the
average difference between one’s own income and income of persons who are wealthier
leadstoareductionofthedisadvantageousinequalityandinducesapositivewelfare effect
that is approximately 46% of the total effect. The increase in the advantageous inequality
andthewelfaregainfrom theadditionalprestigeprovidesanother24%ofthetotalwelfare
effect. The calculation demonstrates the dominating welfare effect that results from the
process of social comparison with the richer reference individuals. The (West German)
employees seem to be considerably more satisﬁed with their jobs when the inequality
of the regional income is advantageous to themselves, i.e., when they earn more money
than the people in their neighborhood. On the other hand, satisfaction diminishes with an
increase in the average income difference with respect to richer individuals.
6 The relative material welfare effect calculated on the basis of the estimators ˆ b1 = −0.098,ˆ b2 =
0.052,ˆ b3 = 0.064 and a labor income of yi = 2 (in 1000) is
0.064/2
0.5 (0.052+0.098)+0.064/2
= 0.299 . (7)4. Estimation Results 16
Table 3
Job satisfaction and social comparison
reference group
region occupation none
variable coefﬁcient s.e. coefﬁcient s.e. coefﬁcient s.e.
disadvantageous inequality bR
1 -0.098** (0.032) 0.059* (0.026) —
advantageous inequality bR
2 0.052** (0.016) 0.048** (0.016) —
log of labor income (in 1000) b3 0.064+ (0.050) 0.193** (0.045) 0.206** (0.035)
log of working hours -0.342** (0.088) -0.319** (0.089) -0.308** (0.088)
number of years of education -0.018** (0.006) -0.022** (0.007) -0.020** (0.007)
age -0.021* (0.010) -0.025* (0.010) -0.025* (0.010)
age squared 0.000+ (0.000) 0.000+ (0.000) 0.000* (0.000)
sex: female -0.013 (0.034) -0.012 (0.035) -0.010 (0.035)
marital status (reference: single)
married 0.069+ (0.040) 0.100* (0.041) 0.092* (0.040)
married, but separated 0.318** (0.083) 0.344** (0.083) 0.339** (0.082)
divorced 0.116* (0.057) 0.141* (0.058) 0.129* (0.057)
widowed 0.145 (0.141) 0.176 (0.142) 0.186 (0.141)
log of household size 0.132** (0.037) 0.125** (0.037) 0.125** (0.036)
number of children under 18 -0.011 (0.019) -0.011 (0.019) -0.013 (0.019)
house owner 0.021 (0.029) 0.065* (0.028) 0.064* (0.028)
health status (reference: very good)
good -0.460** (0.031) -0.461** (0.031) -0.459** (0.031)
satisfactory -0.997** (0.035) -0.994** (0.035) -0.994** (0.035)
poor -1.545** (0.045) -1.531** (0.046) -1.543** (0.045)
bad -2.099** (0.097) -2.077** (0.099) -2.098** (0.098)
labor force status (reference: low)
training 0.339** (0.068) 0.338** (0.068) 0.393** (0.065)
middle 0.051 (0.031) 0.045 (0.032) 0.040 (0.031)
high 0.219** (0.043) 0.212** (0.044) 0.217** (0.043)
branch of industry (reference: all the others)
other industries 0.020 (0.039) 0.006 (0.039) 0.008 (0.039)
chemical industry 0.027 (0.070) 0.000 (0.071) -0.000 (0.070)
trade -0.103** (0.040) -0.109** (0.040) -0.106** (0.040)
ﬁnancial services 0.011 (0.060) -0.027 (0.062) -0.010 (0.061)
public sector 0.060+ (0.032) 0.066+ (0.033) 0.057+ (0.033)
ﬁrm size (reference: 20-199)
6 5 0.060+ (0.035) 0.066* (0.035) 0.065+ (0.035)
200-1999 0.057+ (0.032) 0.061+ (0.032) 0.061+ (0.032)
> 2000 0.016 (0.033) -0.006 (0.033) -0.002 (0.033)
worry about job security (reference: not concerned)
somewhat concerned -0.413** (0.022) -0.410** (0.022) -0.411** (0.022)
very concerned -1.043** (0.033) -1.035** (0.034) -1.033** (0.033)
face-to-face Interview 0.306** (0.024) 0.313** (0.024) 0.315** (0.024)
number of years since ﬁrst
interview
-0.011** (0.002) -0.009** (0.003) -0.010** (0.003)
ˆ sµ 0.208 (0.022)
ˆ sn 1.128 (0.014) 1.131 (0.014) 1.127 (0.014)
ˆ se 1.412 (0.006) 1.425 (0.006) 1.428 (0.006)
Log restricted likelihood -64971.493 -64481.928 -65282.784
N 33868 33594 33993
Note: Job satisfaction is endogenous variable. Signiﬁcance: **61%, *65%, +610%.
All models include dummy variables for the panel year.
Source: GSOEP 1995 to 2004.4. Estimation Results 17
Table 4
Simultaneous social comparison within regional and occupational reference group
random effects ﬁxed effects
variable coefﬁcient s.e. coefﬁcient s.e.
region: disadvantageous inequality bR
1 -0.132** (0.031) -0.051 (0.040)
region: advantageous inequality bR
2 0.025 (0.029) 0.005 (0.035)
occupation: disadvantageous inequality bO
1 0.062* (0.026) 0.070* (0.033)
occupation: advantageous inequality bO
2 0.034 (0.029) -0.000 (0.034)
log of labor income (in 1000) b3 0.070 (0.054) 0.288** (0.078)
log of working hours -0.327** (0.090) -0.271* (0.115)
number of years of education -0.020** (0.007) 0.005 (0.017)
age -0.026* (0.010) —
age squared 0.000* (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
sex: female -0.004 (0.036) —
marital status (reference: single)
married 0.093* (0.041) 0.031 (0.065)
married, but separated 0.358** (0.084) 0.294** (0.113)
divorced 0.140* (0.059) 0.119 (0.099)
widowed 0.176 (0.145) 0.190 (0.319)
log of household size 0.121** (0.037) 0.008 (0.051)
number of children under 18 -0.007 (0.019) 0.051+ (0.027)
house owner 0.062* (0.029) 0.115** (0.044)
health status (reference: very good)
good -0.453** (0.031) -0.331** (0.035)
satisfactory -0.977** (0.035) -0.715** (0.041)
poor -1.510** (0.046) -1.131** (0.054)
bad -2.043** (0.099) -1.561** (0.113)
labor force status (reference: low)
training 0.320** (0.069) 0.475** (0.093)
middle 0.044 (0.032) 0.040 (0.040)
high 0.208** (0.045) 0.198** (0.056)
branch of industry (reference: all the others)
other industries 0.007 (0.039) 0.027 (0.054)
chemical industry -0.004 (0.072) -0.088 (0.107)
trade -0.101* (0.041) -0.022 (0.058)
ﬁnancial services -0.019 (0.064) 0.091 (0.124)
public sector 0.065+ (0.034) 0.032 (0.055)
ﬁrm size (reference: 20-199)
6 5 0.063+ (0.035) -0.043 (0.049)
200-1999 0.067* (0.032) 0.172** (0.042)
> 2000 0.005 (0.034) 0.123** (0.047)
worry about job security (reference: not concerned)
somewhat concerned -0.407** (0.022) -0.337** (0.025)
very concerned -1.028** (0.034) -0.909** (0.039)
face-to-face Interview 0.308** (0.024) 0.248** (0.031)
number of years since ﬁrst interview -0.010** (0.003) -0.034+ (0.019)
Note: Job satisfaction is endogenous variable. N=32901. Signiﬁcance: **61%, *65%, +610%.
All models include dummy variables for the panel year.
Source: GSOEP 1995 to 2004.4. Estimation Results 18
In order to provide further insight into the mechanism of self-value and the process
of social comparison, an occupational reference group was also generated. It has to be
noticed that the social comparison has a statistically signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the job sat-
isfaction in the occupational reference group. The upward comparison again seems to
dominate the downward comparison, which can be seen from an evaluation of the estima-
tors for b1 and b2, respectively.
The highly signiﬁcant, positive estimator for disadvantageous inequality is of special
interest in this model. The larger the average difference in income regarding the richer
comparison group is, the higher job satisfaction is. A possible explanation for this result
is the information effect discussed in Section 2. Evidently, employees in an occupational
group derive welfare increasing information about their future income from an unequal
distribution of income. The fact that there are persons in the reference group who make
more money than they do is interpreted as a chance for a future improvement in their
own ﬁnancial situations. Apparently, they hope to beneﬁt from income inequality in the
future—either by a gain in prestige or an improvement in material welfare. The evalua-
tion of the size of the coefﬁcients of the advantageous and the disadvantageous inequality
indicates that the hope for a future income improvement has an even greater inﬂuence
on job satisfaction than the prestige effect. It also follows that the prestige effect cannot
compensate for the loss of hope for a ﬁnancial improvement. (The loss of hope of an
improvement is an inevitable consequence of the realization of the improvement.) While
both future prospects and actual success in the job have a positive impact on job satisfac-
tion, envy seems to play no or only a minor role for persons in the same occupation since
the information effect is the dominant outcome of disadvantageous inequality.
Finally, the social comparison within the regional and the occupational reference
group is analyzed simultaneously(cf. table4). The random effects estimationvery clearly
conﬁrms the dominance of upward social comparison. The coefﬁcients of disadvanta-
geousinequalityarehighlysigniﬁcantforboththeregionalandtheoccupationalreference
group. The downward comparison with poorer reference people is of only minor impor-
tance for the individuals’ job satisfaction. Obviously, individuals compare themselves
primarily with persons who are more ﬁnancially successful. The welfare effects derived
from disadvantageous inequality remain different with respect to the reference group. In-5. Discussion 19
come inequality is clearly welfare decreasing in the context of a regional reference group
whereas it improves job satisfaction within an occupational group.
Theseresults are supportedby ﬁxed effects estimation. Theupward social comparison
dominatesin the perception of welfare. The distributionof incomewithin an occupational
group has a clearly positive impact on job satisfaction.
5 Discussion
The results of this study indicatethat individualsmake social comparisons that affect their
well-being. Remarkably, theperception ofdisadvantageousincomeinequalitydependson
the reference group. On the one hand, individuals have an aversion to disadvantageous
income inequality in the region they live in, while on the other hand they prefer inequality
in their occupational group. It is suggested that this positivewelfare effect is based on the
expectation of a favorable development of one’s own income in the future (information
effect).
Furthermore, upward comparison dominates downward comparison regarding the
absolute impact on well-being. Apparently, disadvantageous income inequality has
a stronger (positive or negative) impact on the individual welfare than advantageous
inequality. This seems to imply loss aversion as argued in the prospect theory (cf.
Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992).
In the case of a regional reference group, the income comparison takes place primarily
between persons with different occupations. As there is no evidence for feelings of envy
among persons with the same occupation, the conclusion can be drawn that people are
envious of people from other occupations. Individuals seem to disapprove of the disad-
vantageous variation in wages between different occupations. Obviously, people suppose
income inequality in the nearby region to be unfair.
Frank (1991) calls the dependence of welfare on relative income and/or consumption
“positional externalities” because of their afﬁnity with external environmental effects.
In analogy to the public good problem, he recommends public policy intervention (cf.
Frank 1997). In this sense, the legitimacy of a sizeable variation in income seems to be
questionable when the citizens have to accept a loss in welfare due to an external effect
of the distribution of income. Rich people often argue that their incomes are legitimated5. Discussion 20
by the (labor) market. The opinion, however, that market distribution can function as a
yardstick for a fair distributionof incomemust be doubted when the aversion to a regional
disadvantageous income inequality is considered.A. Descriptive Statistics 21
A Descriptive Statistics
Table 5
Descriptive statistics
variable mean s.e. min. max.
job satisfaction 7.161 1.955 0 10
log of gross labor income (in 1000) 0.839 0.558 -2.973 3.798
log of working hours 3.749 0.136 3.555 4.382
number of years of education 12.250 2.623 7 18
age 39.236 11.179 17 65
age squared 1664.389 901.104 289 4225
sex: female 0.317 0.465 0 1
marital status
single 0.323 0.467 0 1
married 0.572 0.495 0 1
married, but separated 0.018 0.131 0 1
divorced 0.079 0.270 0 1
widowed 0.010 0.099 0 1
log of household size 0.923 0.494 0 2.398
number of children under 18 0.614 0.920 0 8
house owner 0.506 0.500 0 1
health status
very good 0.125 0.331 0 1
good 0.493 0.500 0 1
satisfactory 0.290 0.454 0 1
poor 0.082 0.274 0 1
bad 0.010 0.099 0 1
labor force status
training 0.055 0.228 0 1
low 0.181 0.385 0 1
middle 0.517 0.500 0 1
high 0.247 0.431 0 1
branch of industry
other industries 0.123 0.329 0 1
chemical industry 0.037 0.190 0 1
trade 0.115 0.319 0 1
ﬁnancial services 0.061 0.239 0 1
all the others 0.664 0.474 0 1
public sector 0.287 0.452 0 1
ﬁrm size
6 5 0.185 0.389 0 1
20-199 0.280 0.449 0 1
200-1999 0.248 0.432 0 1
> 2000 0.287 0.452 0 1
worry about job security
not concerned 0.504 0.500 0 1
somewhat concerned 0.382 0.486 0 1
very concerned 0.114 0.317 0 1
face-to-face interview 0.555 0.497 0 1
number of years since ﬁrst interview 7.742 6.245 0 20
Note: Calculations for the sample without social comparison in table 3 (N = 33993).
Source: GSOEP 1995 to 2004.REFERENCES 22
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